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CASE COMMENTS
to ignore words in ,the will as ,the majority has done. Nor would ,there
have been a real 'hardship inflicted upon the express legatees. Herbert's
widow would still have been entitled to receive the same income she
would have received if Herbert had died with children surviving him.
And, upon her death the educational institutions would have been en-
entitled to receive ,the same part of ,the corpus they would have gotten
if Herbert had been survived by children.
RICHARD KELLY WnrrE, JR.
COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL IN SUCCESSIVE CRIMINAL
AND CIVIL ACTIONS
The question of the admissibility of the criminal judgment of
conviction -in a succeeding civil action has been frequently considered,'
but it ,is still unsettled as is evident in the recent California case of
Teitelbaum Furs, Inc. v. Dominion Ins. Co.
2
Teitelbaum is an action by a corporation against an insurance
company 'to recover the value of furs allegedly stolen from the plain-
tiff's store. A prior criminal proceeding3 established that the president
of ,the corporation had conspired ito commit grand theft and to present
and file false insurance claims. The president was convicted. The
corporation later instituted this civil action to recover the insurance
for the alleged 'theft. The defendant denied that any theft had occurred
and sought to use 'the prior judgment of conviction as a bar to the civil
action. Judgment was entered for the plaintiff, and tle defendant ap-
pealed.4 The district court of appeals -held that the prior judgment
of conviction was inadmissible as a bar 'to the succeeding civil action,
but ,that 'it was admissible for ,the purpose of impeachment. In a vig-
orous dissenting opinion, one judge said -that there had been a con-
'See 40 Calif. L. Rev. 225 (1952); and the following annotations; 18 A.L.R.2d
1287 (1951); i3o A.L.R. 69o (1941); 8o A.L.R. 1145 (1932); 57 A.L.R. 504 (1928);
31 A.L.R. (1924).
2203 Cal. App. 2d 589, 21 Cal. Rptr. 671 (Dist. Ct. App. 1962).
:People v. Teitelbaum, 163 Cal. App. 2d 184, 329 P.gd 157 (Dist. Ct. App.), cert.
denied, 359 U.S. 206 (1958).
'The trial court granted the defendant a new trial after the plaintiff ob-
tained a jury verdict in the superior court. The new trial was granted on the
ground that the evidence was insufficient to justify the verdict and also upon the
ground that the plaintiff's attorney prevented the defendant from having a fair
trial due to irregular proceedings on the part of plaintiff's counsel. The plaintiff
appealed from this order granting a new trial. The defendant filed a cross appeal
from the jury verdict in favor of the plaintiffs.
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clusive -idjudication in -the criminal proceeding of the basic facts in-
volved, and hence, the criminal judgment of conviction should be
admitted to bar the present civil action.
Applying -the standard definitions,5 it appears that the question
presented in Teitelbaum is technically neither one of res judicata
nor collateral estoppel. The judgment in the criminal case is not res
judicata since there are different causes of action, i.e., the first case
was criminal -and the second civil, and also the parties are different.
The judgment is not technically an estoppel because of the lack of
mutuality, the insurance company not being a party to the criminal
action.
6
Basically, there are two views as to the admissibility of a criminal
judgment of conviction in a succeeding civil action.7 The majority
holds that a prior judgment of conviction is not admissible in a sub-
sequent civil action as evidence of the facts on which it was based.8
Under the modern trend, still the minority rule, the general exclu-
sionary rule has been abandoned. The prior conviction is admissible
as evidence of the facts on which it was based as a bar to the subse-
quent civil action.9 There is a difference of opinion, however, as to
'Res judicata and collateral estoppel may be broadly defined as judicial rules
which operate to prevent redetermination of an issue already litigated between the
same parties in a previous action; however, the terms are not synonymous. Res
judicata, in its narrow interpretation, applies when a second suit on the same
cause of action arises between the same parties or their privies. It precludes the
relitigation of all issues that were raised or might have been raised by the parties
in the former action. Collateral estoppel operates to prevent relitigation of issues
which were actually litigated between the same parties or their privies though
the former suit concerned a different cause of action. Cromwell v. County of
Sac. 94 U.S. 351 (1876).
"Eagle, Star and British Dominions Ins. Co. v. Heller, 149 Va. 82, 104, 140 S.E.
314, 321 (1927).
7Some states by statute expressly exclude prior criminal convictions in subse-
quent civil actions. Minn. Stat § 169.94 (1949).
Under the antitrust laws, a- judgment of conviction is admissible against a
defendant in a subsequent treble-damage action which emanates from the anti-
trust violation. 38 Stat. 731 (1914) as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 16 (955), Emich Motors
Corp. v. General Motors Corp., 340 U.S. 558 (1951).
sBurbank v. McIntyre, 135 Cal. App. 482, 27 P.2d 400 (Dist. Ct. App. 1933);
McKenna v. Whipple, 97 Conn. 695, ix8 At. 40 (1922); Metropolitan Life Ins.
Co. v. Hand, 25 Ga. App. 90, o2 S.E. 647 (1920); Dimmick v. Follis, 123 Ind. App.
701, 111 N.E.2d 486; Skelbar v. Downey, 220 Mo. App. 5, 285 S.W. 148 (1926):
Scjeharie County Cooperative Daries v. Eisenstein, 22 N.J. Super. 503, 92 A.2d
390 (Sup. Ct. 1952); Interstate Dry Goods Stores v. Williamson, 91 W. Va. 156,
112 S.E. 301 (1922).
gConnecticut Fire Ins. Co. v. Ferrar, 227 F.2d 388 (8th Cir. 196o); United States
v. Guzzone, 273 F.2d 121 (2nd Cir. 1959); Austin v. United States, 125 F.2d 816 (7th
Cir. 1942); O'Neill v. United States, 198 F.2d 367 (E.D.N.Y. 1961); United States
112
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the weight to be given to the prior judgment. Where the criminal
defendant is the plaintiff in the civil action, the federal courts gen-
erally hold that the judgment is conclusive.' 0 Some states hold that
the judgment of conviction is only prima facie evidence to be submit-
ted to ,the jury."'
Essentially four arguments are advanced in support of the majority
rule excluding the admission of the judgment. One argument fre-
quently advanced in older cases is that mutuality of estoppel does not
exist among the parties. 12 Mutuality exists only when the party seeking
to estop another would likewise be bound if the former judgment
had been adverse to his interests.13
The argument most often used is that there is no identity of
parties or -their privies'14 in the criminal and civil actions. 15 This argu-
ment arises since the parties to the former action are the state and
the defendant, whereas in the latter action the contest is between
private parties.
A third argument made in support of the majority is that the dif-
ferent procedural rules in civil and criminal actions should preclude
v. Ben Grunstein & Sons Co., 127 F. Supp. 907 (D.C.N.J. 1955); United States v. Bow-
er, 95 F. Supp. 19 (E.D. Tenn. 1961); Approximately 50 Gaming Devices v. People ex
rel. Burke, 11o Colo. 82, 130 P.2d 920 (1942); Greenwell's Adm'r v. Burba, 298
Ky. 255, 182 S.W.2d 436 (1944); Schindler v. Royal Ins. Co., 258 N.Y. 310, 179
N.E. 71, (1932); Eagle, Starr and British Dominions Ins. Co. v. Heller, 149 Va.
82, 140 S.E. 314 (1927).
1°Connecticut Fire Ins. Co. v. Ferrara, 227 F.2d 388 (8th Cir. 196o); United
States v. Grabling, i8o F.2d 498 (5 th Cir. 1950); Austin v. United States, 125 F.2d
816 (7 th Cir. 1942); O'Neill v. United States, 198 F. Supp. 367, 369 (E.D.N.Y. 1961);
United States v. Ben Grunstein & Sons Go., 127 F. Supp. 907 (D.C.N.J. 1955); United
States v. Bower, 95 F. Supp. 19 (E.D. Tenn. 1951).
"Fidelity Phoenix Fire Ins. Co. v. Murphy, 226 Ala. 226, 126 So. 387 (1933);
North River Ins. Co. v. Militello, 100 Colo. 343, 67 P.2d 625 (1937); Wolff v.
Employer Fire Ins. Co., 282 Ky. 824, 140 S.W.2d 640 (1940); Schindler v. Royal
Ins. Co. 258 N.Y. 3io, 179 N.E. 711 (1932).
'-Chamberlain v. Pierson, 87 Fed. 420 (4th Cir. 1898); Young v. Copple, 52 Ill.
App. 547 (1894); Rosenberg v. Salvatore, i N.Y. Supp. 326 (City Ct., Spec. Term
1888); Henaker v. Howe, 60 Va. (ig Gratt.) 50 (1869).
13Brooklyn City & N.R. v. National Bank, 102 U.S. 14 (1880); Adriaanse v.
United States, 184 Fed.2d 968 (2d Cir. 195o).
"Under the term "parties," the law includes all who are directly interested in
the subject matter, and had a right to make a defense, or to control the proceedings
and to appeal from the judgment. Privity depends upon the relation of the parties to
the subject matter rather than their activity in a suit relating to the later civil
proceedings. Biglow v. Old Dominion Copper N. & S. Co., 225 U.S. 111 (1912); Fish
V. Vanderlip, 28 N.Y. 29, 112 N.E. 425 (1961); Restatement, Judgments § 83, com-
ment a (1942).
15Harper v. Blase, 112 Colo. 5 18, 151 P.2d 760 (1944); Corbley v. Wilson, 71 Il.
209 (1874); Interstate Dry Goods Stores v. Williamson, 91 W. Va. 156, 112 S.E. 301
(1932).
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any binding effect of one upon the other.10 An example of this is
the privilege of the accused in a criminal action to refuse to testify
as opposed to the absence of such a privilege in a civil act-ion.
A fourth argument often encountered is that the issues in ques-
tion were not the ultimate issues of the criminal action. An ultimate
issue is defined as one which is material, relevant and necessary to a
decision of the case on its merits. It is an issue which relates to the
substantive law of the criminal action."
A leading case which supports the majority rule is the West Vir-
ginia decision in Interstate Dry Good Stores v. Williamson.18 The
plaintiff brought this civil action to recover the value of goods al-
legedly stolen from his store by the defendant. In a previous criminal
action the defendant had been convicted of burglarizing the plain-
tiff's store. The issue presented was whether a judgment rendered
in a criminal trial could be used as evidence in a civil suit to prove
that 'the defendant had in fact stolen ,the goods from the plaintiff's
store. The trial court held that the judgment of conviction was inad-
missible in a subsequent civil action to establish that 'the defendant
had stolen the goods. In affirming the decision of the lower court, the
Supreme Court of Appeals said:
"It ,is uniformily held that a judgment of conviction... is not
proper evidence in a civil case.... The parties to the criminal
prosecution are different. The rules are different... and the
purposes and objects sought 'to be accomplished are essentially
different.... In a criminal case, the guilt of the accused must
be proven beyond a reasonable doubt, while this is not the rule
in civil trials. The criminal proceeding is between the state and
the accused party, and seeks the vindication of a public right
while in a civil suit the purpose sought is vindication of purely
private rights and interests."1 9
The Virginia case of Eagle, Star and British Dominion Ins. Co. v.
Heller2o is a leading case which discusses the minority view.21 This was
18Myers v. Maryland Cas. Co., 123 Mo. App. 682, 101 S.W. 124 (i9o7); Fenville
v. Atlanta & C. Air Line R.R., 93 S.C. 287, 95 S.E. 172 (1912); Interstate Dry Goods
Stores v. Williamson, 91 W. Va. 156, 112 S.E. 301 (1922); 2 Freeman, Judgments §
654 (5 th ed. 1925).
"TFrank v. Mangum, 237 U.S. 309, 334 (1915); The Evergreens v. Nunan, 141
F.2d 927 (2d Cir. 1944).
891 W. Va. 156, 112 S.E. 301 (1922).
D91 W. Va. at 159, 112 S.E. at 302.
0149 Va. 82, 140 S.E. 314 (1927).
-A more recent opinion which cites Eagle and analyzes the question of the
admissibility of the judgment of conviction is Connecticut Fire Ins. Co. v. Ferrara,
227 F.2d 388 (8th Cir. 196o).
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a civil action similar to the Teitlebaum problem wherein the insured
plaintiff sought to recover on a fire insurance policy from the de-
fendant insurance company. In a former criminal action,22 the plain-
tiff had been convicted of wilfully burning his home with intent to
injure the insurer. In -the subsequent civil action, the defendant filed
both a plea of res judicata and collateral estoppel, but the trial court
rejected both defenses and held for the plaintiff. The highest court
of Virginia reversed and held that the former conviction was conclu-
sive upon the plaintiff and a bar to the civil action. The court said:
"The rule of exclusion is a shield for the protection of those who
have had no opportunity to assert their defense. To apply it
here would be to convert it into a sword in the hands of one who
has had such an opportunity, to be used by him for the effectua-
tion of the same fraud which had been established, condemned,
and punished in -the criminal case. If there be a rule which can-
not stand the rule of reason, it is a bad rule."2 3
The rules relating to the admissibility of the judgment of convic-
tion are further complicated by -the numerous exceptions24 recognized
by both majority and minority jurisdictions.
The one exception generally recognized by courts adhering to
,the majority rule arises where the record of a plea of guilty to a crim-
inal charge is offered as evidence in civil action: the plea will be ad-
mitted as a declaration against interest.2 5 This exception is limited
to the plea itself and does little to remedy the problem in Teitelbaum.
Numerous exceptions arise under the minority rule. The judg-
ment is not admissible when the trial resulted in an acquittal, which
merely shows that the necessary burden of proof was not carried.26
The judgment is inadmissible when the conviction is pending appeal
since .the finality of the conviction is still in question.2 T In many states,
'Heller v. Commonwealth, 137 Va. 782, 119 S.E. 69 (1923).
'149 Va. 82, io6, 140 S.E. 314, 321 (1927).
21See Restatement, Judgments, Chapter 4 (1942).
2Risdon v. Yates, 145 Cal. 210, 78 Pac. 641 (19o4); Galvin v. Terres, 8 Il. App.
2d 227, 131 N.E.2d 367 (1956); Interstate Dry Goods Stores v. Williamson, 91 W. Va.
156, 112 S.E. 3o (1922). See A.L.R. annotations cited in note i supra for further
cases.
'"United States v. National Ass'n of Real Estate Boards, 339 U.S. 485 (195o);
Stone v. United States, 167 U.S. 178 (1897); United States v. Bush, 294 F.2d i (5 th
Cir. 1961); Schindler v. Royal Ins. Co., 258 N.Y. 31o, 179 N.E. 711 (1932); Eagle,
Star and British Dominions Ins. Co. v. Heller, 149 Va. 82, 140 S.E. 314 (1927)
(dictum).
-rTwin Ports Oil Co. v. Pure Oil Co., 26 F. Supp. 366 (D. Minn. 1939); Pendle-
ton v. Norfolk & W.R.R., 82 W. Va. 270, 95 S.E. 941 (1918); Marshak v. City of
Long Beach, 195 Misc. 125, 91 N.Y.S.2d 74 (Sup. Ct. 1948).
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conviction of a minor offense, such as a traffic violation, is not admis-
sible when offered in the subsequent civil action.28
A comparison of the two leading cases will show that in Inter-
state, the criminal defendant was the defendant in the subsequent
civil action; whereas in Eagle, the criminal defendant was the plain-
tiff in ,the subsequent civil action. It is submitted that the procedural
difference in the two cases reveals the basic weakness of the exclu-
sionary rule, for in Eagle the criminal defendant is affirmatively at-
tacking the judgment of conviction and is activily seeking to benefit
from the crime he committed. In Interstate, the criminal defendant
is merely defending the issue raised by a third party to the criminal
action. This basic flaw of strict adherence to the majority rule is clearly
manifested by the factual situation presented in Teitelbaum; i.e.,
where the subsequent civil 'action is commenced by the criminal de-
fendant for -the purpose of profiting from .his criminal conduct. To
immunize such a party from the effects of his former conviction should
be held -to be against public policy,2 9 for it is a basic principle of Am-
erican jurisprudence that one may not profit from his own crime.30
Certainly no injustice would befall the criminal defendant, for he
had his day in court with the opportunity to produce his witnesses
and to appeal from a judgment of conviction, which will not be up-
held unless the evidence establishes guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
The problem is not resolved by the suggestion in the majority
opinion of Teitelbaum, that the criminal conviction may be shown
for purposes of impeachment, since impeachment material has no pro-
bative value.31 Neither is the problem resolved by admitting the
former conviction as a declaration against interest, since that rule
is applicable only when the accused has entered a plea of guilty.
32
In conclusion, it -is submitted that a distinction must be made when
'Arkansas specifically excludes the admissibility of minor traffic violations by
statute. Ark. Stat. Ann. § 75-101, (Supp. 1961). (Garver v. Utyesonicb, 356 S. W.d 744
(Ark. 1962)].
New York excludes convictions of minor traffic violations by judicial decision.
Alther v. News Syndicate Co., 276 App. Div. 169, 93 N.Y.S.2d 537 (1949). See also
Smith v. Goodwin, 103 Ga. App. 248, ii 9 S.E.2d 35 (1961); Forney v. Morrison, 144
W. Va. 746, 110 S.E.2d 84o (1959).
'Mineo v. Eureka Security Fire SL Marine Ins. Co., 182 Pa. Super. 75, 125 A.2d
612, 617 (1956).
1°New York Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Armstrong. 117 U.S. 591, 6oo (1886); Con-
necticut Fire Ins. Co. v. Ferrara, 227 F.2d 388 (8th Cir. 1961); Grose v. Holland, 357
Mo. 874, 211 S.W.2d 464, 466 (1948).
3iSee cases collected in 3 Wigmore, Evidence § ioi8, Annot. 133 A.L.R. 1454
(1941.
2See note 25 supra.
